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A Judicial Balancing Act: Evaluating 
the First Amendment Claims of 
Sitting Judges 
In re Kemp, 894 F.3d 900 (8th Cir. 2018). 
Zeb J. Charlton* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On April 14, 2017, members of the New Millennium Church in Little 
Rock, Arkansas, gathered outside of Arkansas’s Governor’s Mansion to 
protest capital punishment.1  The mansion’s resident, Governor Asa 
Hutchinson, had recently scheduled eight executions for the month of April.2  
Two members of the congregation held signs reading, “Other states are trying 
to abolish the death penalty[,] mine’s putting it on express lane.”3  New 
Millennium Church’s lead minister Wendell Griffen lay on a cot in front of 
his parishioners to symbolize the use of capital punishment on Jesus Christ.4 
 
* B.A., University of Missouri, 2018; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School 
of Law, 2021; Associate Member, Missouri Law Review, 2019-2020.  I am grateful 
to Dean Paul Litton and Dean Lyrissa Lidsky for their insight, guidance, and support 
during the writing of this Note, as well as the Missouri Law Review for its help in the 
editing process. 
 1.  Andrew DeMillo, Arkansas Judge Who Joined Protest Barred From 
Execution Case, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWS, April 18, 2017, 
https://apnews.com/908e24606d5a4f31adf3615ffdcb5884/arkansas-judge-who-
joined-protest-barred-execution-case [https://perma.cc/U2Q6-A9XK]. 
 2.  Shawna Meyers, Arkansas Governor Releases Execution Dates for Eight 
Death Row Inmates, KFSM-TV (Feb. 27, 2017 2:28 PM), 
https://5newsonline.com/2017/02/27/arkansas-governor-releases-execution-dates-
for-eight-death-row-inmates/ [https://perma.cc/G79C-W26W]. 
 3.  Assoc. Press, Outcry After Arkansas Judge Who Stayed Executions Joins 
Anti-death Penalty Rally, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 15, 2017, 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/apr/15/arkansas-executions-judge-
wendell-griffen-death-penalty-protest [https://perma.cc/Q7TE-EDEL]. 
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In addition to serving as pastor of New Millennium Church, Wendell 
Griffen serves as an elected judge on Arkansas’s Sixth Judicial Circuit.5  On 
the same day as the protest, Judge Griffen was assigned to oversee a drug 
manufacturer’s lawsuit involving Arkansas’s use of the drug vecuronium 
bromide in executions.6  Judge Griffen granted the drug manufacturer’s 
request for a temporary restraining order, preventing the use of vecuronium 
bromide in Arkansas executions until further notice.7  Arkansas’s Attorney 
General immediately appealed Judge Griffen’s order, arguing that Judge 
Griffen’s participation in the Governor’s Mansion protest and subsequent 
ruling violated Arkansas’s Code of Judicial Ethics.8  The Attorney General 
requested that Judge Griffen’s temporary restraining order be overruled and 
that Judge Griffen be removed from further proceedings in the instant case.9 
The Arkansas Supreme Court subsequently overruled Judge Griffen’s 
temporary restraining order and removed Judge Griffen from all present and 
future cases involving capital punishment.10  Judge Griffen filed suit against 
the Arkansas Supreme Court, alleging, inter alia, that his First Amendment 
freedom of speech rights had been violated.11 
The proper constitutional standard for evaluating the First Amendment 
claims of sitting judges has been an open question since Republican Party of 
Minnesota v. White.12  This Note argues the balancing test governing the First 
Amendment rights of public employees created in Pickering v. Board of 
Education13 should be used to adjudicate the First Amendment suits of active 
state judges.  Pickering’s balancing test is then applied to the First 
Amendment retaliation claims of Judge Wendell Griffen against the Arkansas 
Supreme Court and its justices to demonstrate the operation of the balancing 
test in this context.14  The Note concludes with a short discussion of permanent 
reassignment, the Arkansas Supreme Court’s selected remedy in this case. 
II. FACTS AND HOLDING 
Unlike the majority of judges in the American judicial system, Judge 
Wendell Griffen of Arkansas’s Sixth Circuit does not shy away from 
commenting on public issues.15  The Judge describes himself on Twitter as a 
“Pastor, judge, social justice advocate, and consultant on cultural competency, 
 
 5.  DeMillo, supra note 1. 
 6.  In re Kemp, 894 F.3d 900, 904 (8th Cir. 2018). 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. at 904–905. 
 11.  Id. at 905. 
 12.  536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
 13.  391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
 14.  See id.; In re Kemp, 894 F.3d at 905. 
 15.  See infra text accompanying notes 16–22. 
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justice, and relation between faith and public policy.”16  From December 2014 
to January 2019, Griffen regularly posted political, religious, and social 
commentary on his personal blog titled “Justice is a Verb!”17  Judge Griffen 
blogged on contemporary political topics such as President Donald Trump,18 
the contentious nomination of Justice Brett Kavanaugh,19 and white 
supremacy.20 
Judge Griffen also frequently disclosed his personal views of the death 
penalty on “Justice is a Verb!”21  On April 10, 2017, Judge Griffen’s post 
entitled “Religious Faith and Homicidal Motives During the Holy Week” 
contained the following statement:  
Premeditated and deliberate killing of defenseless persons—including 
defenseless persons who have been convicted of murder—is not 
morally justifiable.  Using medications designed for treating illness 
and preserving life to engage in such premeditated and deliberate 
killing is not morally justifiable.  Any morally unjustified and 
unjustifiable killing produces moral injury.  Beginning a week from 
today, and three days after Good Friday—on Monday, April 17—the 
political, religious, commercial, and social captains of empire in 
Arkansas will commence a series of morally unjustified and 
unjustifiable killings.  Each death will be a new, and permanent, moral 
injury.  These deaths will join the existing long list of atrocities, 
oppression, and other moral injuries associated with our state to cause 
people around the world to associate Arkansas with bigotry, hate, and 
other forms of injustice as long as human memory continues.22 
 
 16.  Wendell Griffen (@Judggriff) Twitter (last visited Sept. 25, 2020), 
https://twitter.com/judggriff?lang=en [https://perma.cc/M86C-GRCT]. 
 17.  Wendell Griffen, Trump’s Shutdown: A Malicious Spectacle of Moral, 
Political and Humanitarian Failure, JUSTICE IS A VERB! (Jan. 16, 2019), 
https://wendelllgriffen.blogspot.com/ [https://perma.cc/3RC8-N6RN]. 
 18.  Wendell Griffen, Treating Donald Trump like a Psychopath, JUSTICE IS A 
VERB! (Dec.26, 2018), https://wendelllgriffen.blogspot.com/2018/12/treating-donald-
trump-like-psychopath_26.html [https://perma.cc/669S-QXA3]; Wendell Griffen, 
Imbecile in Chief, JUSTICE IS A VERB! (July 17, 2018), 
https://wendelllgriffen.blogspot.com/2018/07/imbecile-in-chief.html 
[https://perma.cc/VY23-24HF]. 
 19.  Wendell Griffen, Lessons to Remember About the Kavanaugh Spectacle, 
JUSTICE IS A VERB! (Sept. 28, 2018), 
https://wendelllgriffen.blogspot.com/2018/09/lessons-to-remember-about-
kavanaugh.html [https://perma.cc/4PDC-UYZK]. 
 20.  Wendell Griffen, The Dominant Religion of the United States is White 
Supremacy, JUSTICE IS A VERB! (July 11, 2018), 
https://wendelllgriffen.blogspot.com/2018/07/the-dominant-religion-of-united-
states.html [https://perma.cc/JH83-8D5V]. 
 21.  Griffen, supra note 4. 
 22.  Wendell Griffen, Religious Faith and Homicidal Motives during Holy Week, 
JUSTICE IS A VERB! (Apr. 10, 2017), 
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Later that week, on April 14, Judge Griffen participated in an anti-death 
penalty rally at the Governor’s Mansion.23  Judge Griffen subsequently led a 
prayer vigil with his congregation outside of the Governor’s Mansion.24  After 
the vigil concluded, Judge Griffen laid on a cot “in solidarity with Jesus.”25 
On the same day, McKesson Medical-Surgical, Inc., a distributor of the 
drug vecuronium bromide,26 sued the State of Arkansas, the Arkansas 
Department of Corrections, Arkansas Governor Asa Hutchinson, and 
Arkansas Department of Corrections Director Wendy Kelley.27  The suit was 
assigned to Judge Griffen.28  McKesson argued the State had obtained the drug 
under false pretenses and requested the State return the drug before it was used 
in any executions.29  McKesson sought a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) 
in the case.30  On April 14, Judge Griffen granted McKesson’s request for a 
TRO, preventing the State from “us[ing] the vecuronium bromide obtained 
from [McKesson] until ordered otherwise by this Court.”31 
The Arkansas Attorney General subsequently filed an emergency 
petition seeking a writ of mandamus with the Arkansas Supreme Court.32  The 
Attorney General requested the Arkansas Supreme Court vacate Judge 
Griffen’s TRO and remove Judge Griffen from further proceedings in the 
case.33  The Attorney General’s brief stated that Judge Griffen’s past conduct, 
primarily his protest on April 14, violated Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct 




 23.  In re Kemp, 894 F.3d 900, 904 (8th Cir. 2018). 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Vecuronium bromide is a muscle relaxant typically used in conjunction with 
anesthesia.  Mark Ramzy & Russell K. McAllister, Vecuronium, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
BIOTECHNOLOGY INFORMATION, U.S. NAT’L LIBRARY OF MEDICINE (Mar. 27, 2020), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK493143/ [https://perma.cc/BC4C-7END].  
Arkansas uses vecuronium bromide as the second drug in a three-drug execution 
protocol.  Linda Satter, In Filing, AG Cites 3-Drug Decision; State Urges Look in 
Execution Case, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Sept. 22, 2019, 
https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2019/sep/22/in-filing-ag-cites-3-drug-
decision-2019/ [https://perma.cc/LXM7-GPM6]; see also In re Kemp, 894 F.3d at 
904. 
 27.  In re Kemp, 894 F.3d at 904 (Governor Hutchinson and Director Kelley were 
sued in their official capacity). 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.   
A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in 
which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, 
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hinted Judge Griffen would be unfit to hear any death penalty case, arguing 
that “Judge Griffen cannot be considered remotely impartial on issues related 
to the death penalty.”35   
On April 17, the Arkansas Supreme Court granted the Attorney 
General’s mandamus petition.36  In granting the petition, the court went 
beyond the stated request of the Attorney General, and “immediately 
reassigned all cases in the Fifth Division that involve the death penalty or the 
state’s execution protocol, whether civil or criminal.”37  In a lone published 
dissent, Chief Justice John Dan Kemp would have only removed Judge 
Griffen from the present case, citing the lack of formal investigation into 
Judge Griffen’s alleged bias in capital punishment cases.38  The Arkansas 
Supreme Court also referred Judge Griffen to the “Judicial Discipline and 
Disability Commission to consider whether he ha[d] violated the Code of 
Judicial Conduct.”39 
Judge Griffen sued the Arkansas Supreme Court and its justices in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas.40  Judge 
Griffen brought his claim under several grounds, including: First Amendment 
freedom of speech retaliation, First Amendment religious exercise retaliation, 
violation of Arkansas’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act, denial of his 
Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights, violation of his 
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights, and civil conspiracy.41 
The justices of the Arkansas Supreme Court filed a motion to dismiss, 
arguing that Judge Griffen had stated no plausible grounds for relief.42  The 
district judge refused to grant the Arkansas Supreme Court justices’ motion 
to dismiss.43  On April 13, Judge Griffen sought discovery on the Arkansas 
Supreme Court’s internal deliberations regarding Judge Griffen’s temporary 
restraining order and subsequent litigation.44  On April 24, the Arkansas 
Supreme Court justices petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the 
 
including but not limited to the following circumstances: The 
judge, while a judge or a judicial candidate, has made a public 
statement, other than in a court proceeding, judicial decision, or 
opinion, that commits or appears to commit the judge to reach a 
particular result or rule in a particular way in the proceeding or 
controversy.   
 
  In re Kemp, 894 F.3d at 904 (quoting Ark. Code Jud. Conduct R. 2.11(A)(5)). 
 35.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 36.  In re Pulaski County Circuit Court, No. 17-155, 2017 Ark. LEXIS 154 
(2017) at *2 (per curiam). 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. at *4–5 (Kemp, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 39.  Id. at *2. 
 40.  In re Kemp, 894 F.3d at 905. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
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Eighth Circuit for a writ of mandamus preventing Judge Griffen from 
engaging in discovery.45 
In a two-to-one decision, the Eighth Circuit granted the Arkansas 
Supreme Court justices’ mandamus petition and vacated the district court’s 
denial of the justices’ motion to dismiss.46  However, the court refused to 
discuss the justices’ argument that allowing discovery to proceed would 
interfere with “judicial independence and federalism.”47  The court believed 
it would be unnecessary to wade into the delicate area of federal-state relations 
if Judge Griffen failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted.48 
In the lone dissenting opinion, Judge Kelly would have granted the 
Arkansas Supreme Court justices’ petition for a writ of mandamus, but only 
regarding Judge Griffen’s discovery attempt.49  In Judge Kelly’s view, the 
petitioners in the case did not adequately exhaust their remedies at the district 
court level.50  Judge Kelly reasoned that, without a total exhaustion of 
remedies at the lower level, the petitioners still had other adequate means to 
find the relief they desired, and the court should reject the mandamus 
petition.51  Judge Kelly would later cast the sole vote in favor of granting 
Judge Griffen’s motion for a rehearing en banc,52 but did not file an opinion 
detailing her reasoning.53 
In June 2019, the Arkansas Judicial Discipline and Disability 
Commission dismissed the pending ethics action against Judge Griffen.54  
Pursuant to this dismissal, Judge Griffen petitioned the Arkansas Supreme 
Court to reinstate his ability to hear death penalty cases.55  The Arkansas 
Supreme Court denied Judge Griffen’s petition in a per curiam order, ruling 
that Judge Griffen had not filed a timely petition for rehearing.56 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 910. 
 47.  Id. at 905. 
 48.  Id. (“[T]his court express[es] no view on [the Arkansas Supreme Court’s 
federalism argument], because it is clear and indisputable that the discovery sought by 
Judge Griffen is not relevant to any claim that should survive a motion to dismiss.”) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 49.  Id. at 910–11 (Kelly, J., dissenting). 
 50.  Id. at 910. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  In re Kemp, No. 18-1864, 2018 U.S.  App.  LEXIS 24581, at *1 (Aug. 29, 
2018). 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Debra Cassens Weiss, Ethics Case is Tossed Against Judge Who Protested 




 55.  Id. 
 56.  In re Griffen, No. CV-19-521, 2019 Ark.  251, at *1 (Sept. 19, 2019). 
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III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
 The proper framework for analyzing the extrajudicial speech of sitting 
judges has been the subject of disagreement among twenty-first century 
scholars and courts.57  The United States Supreme Court’s decisions have 
offered little guidance on the First Amendment protections of sitting judges.58  
This has led to conflicting lines of case law when analyzing the First 
Amendment claims of the judiciary.  The majority of federal and state courts 
have followed the seminal judicial campaign case Republican Party of 
Minnesota v. White, which invalidated a provision of Minnesota’s Code of 
Judicial Conduct under strict scrutiny.59  In the alternative, some courts and 
commentators believe active judges’ First Amendment rights should be 
evaluated under the same public employee balancing test established in 
Pickering v. Board Of Education.60 
A.  The White Approach 
For the majority of this nation’s history, judges freely engaged in overt 
political activities,61 such as soliciting funds for partisan candidates,62 
endorsing candidates for elected office,63 and even seeking the presidency.64  
In 1924, the American Bar Association (“ABA”) released the first Canon of 
Judicial Ethics.65  Heavily inspired by former President and sitting Chief 
Justice William H. Taft, the initial Canon “specifically suggested that judges 
refrain from making political speeches, making or soliciting contributions for 
political parties, publicly endorsing candidates, and participating in party 
conventions.”66  However, the ABA only intended the first Canon to be an 
aspirational model of ideal judicial conduct, and judges continued to actively 
partake in politics.67  
The advent of judicial disciplinary commissions, which actively 
enforced long-ignored codes of judicial ethics, began to curb the political 
activities of state judges in the late twentieth century.68  State regulation of 
 
 57.  See Lynne H. Rambo, When Should the First Amendment Protect Judges 
from Their Unethical Speech?, 79 OHIO ST. L.J. 279 (2018). 
 58.  Id. at 283. 
 59.  536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
 60.  391 U.S.  563 (1968). 
 61.  Raymond J.  McKoski, The Political Activities Of Judges: Historical, 
Constitutional, And Self-Preservation Perspectives, 80 U.  PITT.  L.  REV.  245, 249–
56 (2018). 
 62.  Id. at 256; Am. Bar Ass’n, CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS (1924). 
 63. McKoski, supra note 61, at 256–257. 
 64.  Id. at 263. 
 65.  Id. at 250. 
 66.  Id. at 257–58. 
 67.  Id. at 263. 
 68.  Id. at 250. 
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judicial conduct and campaigns remained largely unchallenged until the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,69 which 
cast significant doubt on the constitutionality of judicial campaign 
restrictions.  
In White, the Supreme Court held that a state could not prohibit judicial 
candidates from discussing political or legal issues on the campaign trail.70  At 
issue in White was Minnesota’s “announce clause,” which stated that a 
“‘candidate for a judicial office, including an incumbent judge,’ shall not 
‘announce his or her views on disputed legal or political issues.’”71  Both 
parties agreed that strict scrutiny72 should be used in evaluating the announce 
clause.73  Writing for a five-to-four majority, Justice Scalia rejected 
Minnesota’s arguments that the announce clause was narrowly tailored to 
serve the compelling government interest of “preserving the impartiality of 
the state judiciary and preserving the appearance of the impartiality of the 
state judiciary.”74  In striking down the announce clause, the White majority 
emphasized the role the provision played in the election context: 
Debate on the qualifications of candidates is at the core of our electoral 
process and of the First Amendment freedoms, not at the edges.  The 
role that elected officials play in our society makes it all the more 
imperative that they be allowed freely to express themselves on 
matters of current public importance. It is simply not the function of 
government to select which issues are worth discussing or debating in 
the course of a political campaign.  We have never allowed the 
government to prohibit candidates from communicating relevant 
information to voters during an election.75  
Justice Scalia’s frequent references to judicial elections in the preceding 
text are noteworthy.  In couching his opinion in the language of electoral 
politics, Justice Scalia casts serious doubt on the impact of White outside of 
judicial campaign restrictions.  Further, Justice O’Connor’s concurring 
opinion and Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion placed particular 
importance on the electoral aspect of White.  Justice O’Connor wrote a 
separate concurring opinion for the sole purpose of questioning the soundness 
 
 69.  Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 769 (2002). 
 70.  Id. at 796. 
 71.  Id. at 769 (quoting Minn. Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) 
(2000)). 
 72.  Under strict scrutiny, the state actor must show that a disputed action is 
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.  Id. at 774–75 (citing 
Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 222, (1989)).  
In a challenge to a government action on First Amendment grounds, the government 
must demonstrate the action does not “unnecessarily circumscribe protected 
expression.”  Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 54 (1982). 
 73.  White, 536 U.S. at 775. 
 74. Id. 
 75.  Id. at 781–82 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
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of judicial elections.76  On the other side, Justice Ginsburg’s dissent attacked 
the White majority for what she viewed as a failure to distinguish between 
legislative and judicial elections77 – an argument rejected by Justice Scalia in 
dicta.78 
Thirteen years later, the Supreme Court officially extended White’s use 
of strict scrutiny to all judicial campaign cases in Williams-Yulee v. Florida 
Bar.79  Lanell Williams-Yulee, an aspiring judicial candidate, challenged 
Florida’s ban on the personal solicitation of campaign funds.80  Unlike the 
parties in White, the Williams-Yulee litigants disagreed on the proper 
constitutional standard.  The Florida Bar adopted the position that the law 
should be evaluated under the looser “‘closely drawn’ to match a ‘sufficiently 
important interest’”81 test used in campaign contribution cases.82  Williams-
Yulee argued White83 required the Court to apply strict scrutiny.84  
The Supreme Court agreed with Williams-Yulee and applied strict 
scrutiny to determine if the ban was constitutional,85 reasoning that the 
“closely drawn” standard is only applicable to claims involving the First 
Amendment’s right to free association.86  Even though the Florida Bar lost the 
battle over the proper constitutional standard, the Court determined the 
personal solicitation clause was “one of the rare cases in which a speech 
restriction withstands strict scrutiny.”87  
Like the “announce clause” at issue in White,88 the Williams-Yulee court 
found that preventing judicial candidates from personally soliciting campaign 
funds protects the “‘vital state interest’ in safeguarding ‘public confidence in 
 
 76.  Id. at 788 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 77.  Id. at 805 (Ginsburg, J, dissenting) (“I do not agree with this unilocular, ‘an 
election is an election,’ approach.”). 
 78.  Id. (“[D]espite the number of pages [Justice Ginsburg] dedicates to 
disproving this proposition…we neither assert nor imply that the First Amendment 
requires campaigns for judicial office to sound the same as those for legislative 
office.”). 
 79.  575 U.S. 433 (2015). 
 80.  Id. at 439–42 (citing Fla.  Fla.  Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 7(C)(1) 
(2012)). 
 81.  Id. at 443 (quoting Buckley v.  Valeo, 424 U.  S.  1, 25 (1976) (per curiam)). 
 82.  See, e.g., Buckley v.  Valeo, 424 U.S.  1 (1976) (per curiam). 
 83.  Republican Party of Minnesota v.  White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
 84.  Williams-Yulee, 575 U.S. at 441. 
 85.  Id. at 443 (“As we have long recognized, speech about public issues and the 
qualifications of candidates for elected office [which the fundraising letter included] 
commands the highest level of First Amendment protection.  Indeed, in our only prior 
case concerning speech restrictions on a candidate for judicial office, [Republican 
Party of Minnesota v.  White,] this Court and both parties assumed that strict scrutiny 
applied.”). 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. at 444–45. 
 88.  Supra text accompanying notes 71–75. 
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the fairness and integrity of the nation’s elected judges.’”89  Florida’s ban on 
personal solicitation was found to be narrowly tailored to protect against “a 
public appearance that undermines confidence in the integrity of the 
judiciary,”90 and the regulation was deemed constitutional.91 
B. The Pickering Approach 
In Pickering v. Board of Education,92 the Supreme Court firmly 
established that public employees do not forfeit free speech as a condition of 
public employment.93  The Pickering plaintiff, a public schoolteacher, was 
terminated for writing a letter to a local newspaper criticizing the school 
district’s recent method for raising revenue.94  The local school board 
determined Pickering’s letter was “detrimental to the efficient operation and 
administration of the schools of the district” and that “[the] interests of the 
school require[d] [his dismissal].”95 
The Pickering court applied a balancing test that weighed “the interests 
of [Pickering], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and 
the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the 
public services it performs through its employees.”96  As a statement on 
“matter of legitimate public concern,” the Court afforded great weight to 
Pickering’s First Amendment rights.97  On the other hand, since the letter had 
not “impeded the teacher’s proper performance of his daily duties in 
classroom or to have interfered with the regular operation of the schools 
generally,”98 the State did not have a legitimate reason for terminating 
Pickering.  Since the balancing test tipped in Pickering’s favor, the Court ruled 
the school board had violated Pickering’s First Amendment rights.99 
 In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has further fleshed out the 
requirements for Pickering’s balancing test.  The first inquiry is whether the 
employee “spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern.”100  Broadly 
speaking, an employee cannot satisfy this prong of the balancing test if the 
speech is closely related to the work the employee is compensated for.101  If 
 
 89.  Williams-Yulee, 575 U.S. at 445 (quoting Caperton v.  A. T. Massey Coal 
Co., 556 U.S. 868, 889 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 90.  Id. at 453–54. 
 91.  Id. at 457. 
 92.  391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
 93.  Id. at 574–75. 
 94.  Id. at 564. 
 95.  Id. at 564-65. 
 96.  Id. at 571. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Garcetti v.  Ceballos, 547 U.S.  410, 418 (2006) (citing Pickering v.  Bd.  of 
Education, 391 U.S.  563, 568 (1968)). 
 101.  Id. at 420–21. 
10
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol85/iss3/9
2020] FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIMS OF SITTING JUDGES 835 
the government employee cannot demonstrate they spoke on a matter of 
public concern, they cannot state a viable First Amendment retaliation 
claim.102 
 If the employee’s speech was on a matter of public concern, then the 
court must determine if “the interest of the state, as an employer, in promoting 
the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees’ 
outweighs ‘the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon 
matters of public concern.’”103  The employee’s speech will only be 
unprotected if the state’s interest is greater than the citizen’s.104 
IV. INSTANT DECISION 
In a two-to-one decision, the Eighth Circuit held Judge Griffen did not 
state a plausible claim for relief under Section 1983 for First Amendment 
retaliation.105  The Eighth Circuit reasoned that Judge Griffen did not allege 
he was engaged in a protected activity, and that Judge Griffen suffered no 
adverse employment action.106 
The Eighth Circuit ruled that the Arkansas Supreme Court’s recusal 
order exclusively affected Judge Griffen’s role as a public employee.107  The 
court cited Bauer v. Shepard’s108 finding that a judicial recusal clause only 
affects the First Amendment rights of a judicial candidate in his or her official 
capacity, not as a private citizen.109  Further citing Bauer, the Eighth Circuit 
determined “[t]he state, as employer, may control how its employees perform 
their work, even when that work includes speech (as a judge’s job does).”110  
Like all other public employees, cases may be reassigned to judges who have 
not made inflammatory public statements about a pending case or an issue in 
a case.111 
 
 102.  Connick v.  Myers, 461 U.S.  138, 146 (1983) (“When employee expression 
cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other 
concern to the community, government officials should enjoy wide latitude in 
managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the 
First Amendment.”). 
 103.  Janus v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S.  Ct.  
2448, 2471 (2018) (quoting Harris v.  Quinn, 573 U.S.  616, 653 (2014)). 
 104.  Id. 
 105. In re Kemp, 894 F.3d at 906. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. 620 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that a state’s ban on judge’s political 
campaigning activities did not violate the First Amendment’s Freedom of Speech 
clause). 
 109.  Bauer v. Shephard, 620 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 110.  Id. (citing Garcetti v.  Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006)). 
 111.  In re Kemp, 894 F.3d at 906 (citing Bauer, 620 F.3d at 718); see also Ligon 
v. City of New York, 736 F.3d 166, 169 n.8 (2d Cir. 2013) (“The freedom of speech 
protected by the First Amendment does not mean that there can be no limitations, such 
as those contemplated under section 455(a), on what a federal judge may say, much 
11
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Judge Griffen also failed to allege that he had suffered an adverse 
employment action.  An adverse employment action “produces a material 
employment disadvantage.”112 The Eighth Circuit listed a non-exhaustive 
collection of adverse employment actions, such as termination and a cut in 
pay or benefits.113  Additionally, circumstances which effectively create a 
constructive discharge are an actionable adverse employment action.114 
In ruling that Judge Griffen did not suffer an adverse employment action, 
the Eighth Circuit followed Bauer’s reasoning that a public employee has no 
right to perform any particular task.115  The court implicitly argued that states 
have a compelling interest in assigning judges to hear particular cases as a 
safeguard of litigants’ Due Process rights.116  The court followed with the 
conclusory statement that “[r]ecusal from death penalty cases is not an adverse 
employment action.”117 
V. COMMENT 
The First Amendment states, “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”118  The 
First Amendment’s prohibition against Congressional speech restrictions has 
been incorporated against state government action through the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.119  The United States Supreme Court 
also extended First Amendment protection to online speech in Reno v. 
American Civil Liberties Union.120  Therefore, Judge Griffen’s blog posts on 
“Justice is a Verb!” are entitled to the same First Amendment protections as 
his in-person protest.121 
 
less on where she can say it, especially as it relates to pending litigation… [N]umerous 
courts of appeals have reassigned cases due to an appearance of partiality that was 
traceable to speech by a district judge.”). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. (quoting Kerns v. Capital Graphics, Inc., 178 F.3d 1011, 1016 (8th Cir. 
1999)). 
 115. Id. 
 116.  Id. (quoting Bauer, 620 F.3d at 718) (“A state may decide to assign each case 
to a judge whose impartiality is not in question . . . States are entitled to protect litigants 
by assigning impartial judges before the fact, as well as by removing partial judges 
afterward.”). 
 117.  Id. at 907. 
 118.  U.S. CONST. amend I. 
 119.  Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
 120.  521 U.S. 844 (1996). 
 121.  Reno, 521 U.S. at 844. 
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A. Which Constitutional Standard Should Courts Apply? 
While the majority of courts have followed White and evaluated judges’ 
free speech claims under strict scrutiny,122 Pickering’s balancing test should 
be used to evaluate extrajudicial speech that does not occur as part of a judicial 
campaign.  The most faithful application of White’s holding requires a careful 
evaluation of the circumstances surrounding the judicial official’s speech. 
This context-specific approach was applied by the Seventh Circuit in Siefert 
v. Alexander.123 
In Siefert,124 the Seventh Circuit upheld Wisconsin’s Code of Judicial 
Ethics provisions banning political endorsements and personal solicitation, 
but struck down the code’s prohibition on partisan identification as a violation 
of the First Amendment.125  The Siefert court evaluated the provisions relating 
to personal solicitation and partisan identification under strict scrutiny,126 but 
argued Pickering’s balancing test was well-suited to evaluate the political 
endorsement restriction.127 The court reasoned that “offering an endorsement 
is less a judge’s communication about his qualifications and beliefs than an 
effort to affect a separate political campaign, or even more problematically, 
assume a role as political powerbroker.”128  Thus, the Siefert court partially 
chose Pickering’s balancing test as a pragmatic solution to permit regulation 
of some judicial political activity while still operating within the confines of 
the First Amendment. 
While applying the balancing test set forth in Pickering, the Siefert court 
also adopted the additional factor of promoting judicial integrity in favor of 
the state.129  The Seifert court noted the state’s power to regulate employees’ 
First Amendment activities – in cases such as Pickering,130 Connick,131 and 
 
 122.  See, e.g., Wolfson v.  Concannon, 811 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir. 2016) (applying 
strict scrutiny to judge’s challenge of Arizona’s Judicial Ethics code prohibition on 
personal solicitation, campaigning, and endorsements); Carey v.  Wolnitzek, 614 F.3d 
189 (6th Cir.  2010) (applying strict scrutiny to judge’s challenge of Michigan’s 
identification, solicitation, and commitment clauses); Jenevein v. Willing, 493 F.3d 
551 (5th Cir. 2007) (applying strict scrutiny in evaluating judge’s First Amendment 
claim based on disciplinary action). 
 123.  Siefert v.  Alexander, 608 F.3d 974 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 124.  608 F.3d 974 (7th Cir.  2010). 
 125.  Id. at 977. 
 126.  Id. at 981. 
 127.  Id. at 985–86. 
 128.  Id. at 984. 
 129.  Id. at 985. 
 130.  Pickering v. Bd. of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
 131.  Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
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Garcetti132 – is not only based on the government’s role as employer, but also 
on the duty the state possesses to guarantee its citizens due process of law.133 
The rationale behind the White decision also cuts against applying strict 
scrutiny to extrajudicial speech outside of campaigns.  As noted previously, 
Justice Scalia emphasized the importance of an informed electorate in striking 
down Minnesota’s announce clause.134  Indeed, Justice Kennedy’s concurring 
opinion in White strikes against applying White to extrajudicial speech outside 
of the campaign context: 
This case does not present the question whether a State may restrict 
the speech of judges because they are judges – for example, as part of 
a code of judicial conduct; the law at issue here regulates judges only 
when and because they are candidates.  Whether the rationale of 
Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968), and Connick 
v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), could be extended to allow a general 
speech restriction on sitting judges – regardless of whether they are 
campaigning – in order to promote the efficient administration of 
justice, is not an issue raised here. 
Petitioner Gregory Wersal was not a sitting judge but a challenger; he 
had not voluntarily entered into an employment relationship with the 
State or surrendered any First Amendment rights.135 
 The best analysis of Justice Kennedy’s reasoning cabins White’s 
application of strict scrutiny to judicial campaigns. In the most favorable 
reading for strict scrutiny, Justice Kennedy’s opinion leaves the door ajar for 
courts to choose between Pickering’s balancing test and White’s stringent 
approach.  But reading Justice Kennedy’s opinion as an endorsement of strict 
scrutiny cannot be reconciled with the majority’s reasoning.  In light of Justice 
Scalia’s opinion – which deals in the language of electoral politics136 – the 
better conclusion is that White offers no guidance to the First Amendment 
rights of sitting judges. 
Further, applying a balancing test to sitting judges’ First Amendment 
claims is a more practical solution than applying strict scrutiny.  State and 
local governments have a “legitimate purpose in ‘[promoting] efficiency and 
 
 132.  Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
 133.  Siefert, 608 F.3d at 985 (“We are not concerned merely with the efficiency 
of those services, but that the work of the judiciary conforms with the due process 
requirements of the Constitution.”). 
 134.  See Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 782 (2002) (“It 
is simply not the function of government to select which issues are worth discussing 
or debating in the course of a political campaign.  We have never allowed the 
government to prohibit candidates from communicating relevant information to voters 
during an election.”) (emphasis added). 
 135.  Id. at 796 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 136.  See text accompanying supra notes 75–78. 
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integrity in the discharge of official duties.’”137  To require the state to prove 
that every judicial disciplinary action and rule promulgated is “narrowly 
tailored to further a compelling government interest” would burden state and 
federal courts with litigation relating to the constitutionality of judicial speech 
restrictions,138 frustrating the government’s interest in efficient court services.   
Because the underlying rationale of White cuts against applying strict 
scrutiny to Judge Griffen’s conduct outside of an active judicial campaign, the 
Pickering balancing test should be applied.   
B. Applying Pickering’s Balancing Test 
Judge Griffen brought a First Amendment retaliation claim under 
Section 1983.139  A First Amendment retaliation claim must allege: (1) the 
plaintiff engaged in a protected activity; (2) a government official’s actions 
against the plaintiff “would chill a person of ordinary firmness from 
continuing in the activity”;140 and (3) the government official’s adverse action 
was at least partially motivated by the plaintiff’s exercise of the protected 
activity.141 
To proceed with his First Amendment retaliation claim, Judge Griffen 
must first allege that his speech was on a matter of public concern.142  In the 
Eighth Circuit, courts analyze the “content, form, and context of a given 
statement, as revealed by the whole record” to determine if the speech in 
question touched on an issue of public concern.143  
Judge Griffen’s protest at the Governor’s Mansion was plainly on a 
matter of public concern.144  The imposition of the death penalty in the United 
States has been the cause of much public debate, with members of the 
judiciary frequently thrusting themselves into the center of the conflict.145  
 
 137.  Connick v.  Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150–51 (1983) (quoting Ex parte Curtis, 
106 U.S.  371, 373 (1882)). 
 138.  Rambo, supra note 57 at 307–08 (“Requiring that every ethics rule to which 
a sitting judge is subject be narrowly tailored to its end would place an extraordinary 
burden on the State.”). 
 139.  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
 140.  Revelz v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 876 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting Naucke v. 
City of Park Hills, 284 F.3d 923, 927–28 (8th Cir. 2002)). 
 141.  In re Kemp, 894 F.3d 900, 906 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Revels v. Vincenz, 
382 F.3d 870, 876 (8th Cir. 2004)). 
 142.  Garcetti v.  Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006) (citing Pickering v. Bd. of 
Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)). 
 143.  Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148–149 (1983). 
 144.  Ziccarelli v. Leake, 767 F. Supp. 1450, 1454 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (deciding that 
character testimony at a death penalty hearing was speech on a matter of public 
concern). 
 145.  See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 231–32 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he death penalty is constitutionally invalid for two reasons.  First, the death 
penalty is excessive.  And second, the American people, fully informed as to the 
15
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Candidates in contested judicial elections often emphasize their personal 
views on capital punishment in a calculated move to sway the electorate.146  
Additionally, in determining whether the application of the death penalty 
violates the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme Court has placed special 
emphasis on the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society.”147  The need for robust public debate on the topic of capital 
punishment is required to determine the “evolving standards of decency,” 
whether that be determined through public polling or legislative action.148 
Next, it must be determined whether the speech occurred in the course 
of Judge Griffen’s duties as a member of the judiciary.  As articulated in 
Garcetti v. Ceballos,149 the determinative question is whether the expression 
took place during an activity that the government would compensate the 
employee for.150  Judge Griffen was not acting within the scope of his official 
duties while protesting in front of the Governor’s Mansion.  Presumably, 
Judge Griffen’s responsibilities as a circuit judge include matters such as 
reviewing court filings, hearing cases, and meeting with attorneys.  Notably, 
none of these duties involve Judge Griffen holding a protest against the state 
of Arkansas’s use of capital punishment, leading a prayer ritual outside of the 
Governor’s Mansion, or imitating Jesus’s three days in the tomb.151  Judge 
Griffen’s conduct fits comfortably within other instances of government 
employees acting outside the scope of their employment in protest.152 
But Judge Griffen was not reprimanded solely for his participation in the 
Governor’s Mansion protest or his blog posts.  Instead, Judge Griffen was 
subject to judicial discipline for failing to recuse himself as required by 
Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.11(A)(5),153 which instructs that 
 
purposes of the death penalty and its liabilities, would in my view reject it as morally 
unacceptable.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 146. Stephen B. Bright and Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: 
Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U.L.  
REV. 760 (1995) (discussing the political consequences of capital punishment cases 
for elected judges). 
 147.  Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
 148.  See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 426 (2008) (noting that at the 
time of decision, only six states permitted the death penalty for child rape of any kind). 
 149.  547 U.S. 410, 420–21 (2006). 
 150.  Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 420–21 (2006). 
 151.  Compare Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422 (“Ceballos did not act as a citizen when 
he went about conducting his daily professional activities, such as supervising 
attorneys, investigating charges, and preparing filings.  In the same way he did not 
speak as a citizen by writing a memo that addressed the proper disposition of a pending 
criminal case.”). 
 152.  Pickering v. Bd. of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (finding that a 
schoolteacher’s letter to a local newspaper was outside the scope of his employment); 
Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987) (finding that a government employee’s 
wishful remark to a co-worker that the President was assassinated was outside the 
scope of the employee’s duties). 
 153.  See text accompanying supra notes 32–39. 
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“[a] judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the 
judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”154  A judge’s recusal 
decision may be dependent on the judge’s conduct as a private citizen, but the 
actual recusal action is made as a public employee. Therefore, a judge’s 
recusal decision is wholly within Garcetti’s scope of employment standard.155  
As Judge Griffen was not speaking on a matter of public concern as a private 
citizen, Judge Griffen cannot even trigger Pickering’s balancing test.  
Even if Judge Griffen did speak as a private citizen on a matter of public 
concern, he still cannot state a plausible First Amendment retaliation claim.  
The final step of the Pickering analysis, in the judicial context, is the interest 
of the state in promoting efficient services and ensuring the due process rights 
of litigants.156  In addition to ensuring a smooth functioning court system, the 
judicial system also promotes the effectiveness of its services through the 
perceived impartiality of its judges.157 
The final factor of the balancing test weighs in the state’s favor.  Looking 
at the context of Judge Griffen’s comments and protests, the state had a 
legitimate interest in removing Judge Griffen from the McKesson case.  Judge 
Griffen’s blog post on April 10 is a clear reference to the upcoming April 17 
execution.  Even though Judge Griffen did not directly mention McKesson in 
the April 10 blog post, his comments necessarily implicated the pending 
litigation.  Further, Judge Griffen’s protest in front of the Governor’s Mansion 
took place on the same day McKesson filed its petition for a temporary 
restraining order.  From the standpoint of an impartial and reasonable 
observer, Judge Griffen’s conduct directly impeded the state’s interest in 
promoting the impartial application of the laws and public perception of the 
judiciary. 
As Judge Griffen’s interest in free expression is outweighed by the 
state’s interest in promoting an impartial judicial system, Judge Griffen could 
not successfully allege that he was engaged in a protected activity.  Having 
failed the first part of the First Amendment retaliation test, Judge Griffen 
cannot make a submissible case, and the Eighth Circuit correctly dismissed 
Judge Griffen’s First Amendment retaliation claim. 
C. The Dangers of Permanent Reassignment 
While Judge Griffen did not allege a plausible First Amendment 
retaliation claim, the behavior of the Arkansas Supreme Court should be 
alarming for those concerned about a restrained judiciary.  As Chief Justice 
 
 154.  See text accompanying supra notes 32–39. 
 155.  See In re Kemp, 894 F.3d 900, 906 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Bauer v. 
Shepard, 620 F.3d 704, 718 (7th Cir. 2010)) (“[A recusal order] specifies how he ‘will 
perform official duties,’ or rather, to which duties he is assigned.”). 
 156.  Siefert v. Alexander, 608 F.3d 974 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 157.  See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 446 (2015) (quoting A.T. 
Massey Co. v. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 889) (“public perception of judicial integrity is 
‘a state interest of the highest order.’”).  
17
Charlton: A Judicial Balancing Act: Evaluating the First Amendment Claims o
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2020
842 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
Kemp noted in his dissent, the Arkansas Supreme Court has established 
procedures for investigating the ethical complaints against members of the 
judiciary.158  Given the immediate nature of a temporary restraining order, 
reassigning the McKesson case away from Judge Griffen was a prudent move. 
But in permanently reassigning all cases involving the death penalty 
away from Judge Griffen sua sponte, the Arkansas Supreme Court determined 
that Judge Griffen’s conduct forever tainted his judgment in capital cases 
without an investigation into his actions.  Judge Griffen should not be 
permanently barred from hearing cases involving the death penalty without an 
explicit commitment to rule a certain way in a capital case.  Judge Griffen 
alleged that he has never made such a claim.  Indeed, in a blog post on “Justice 
is a verb!” one year after the events in question, Judge Griffen wrote “I will 
follow [Arkansas law] whenever my authority to preside over capital cases is 
restored.  I took an oath to follow the law, including laws that I consider 
objectionable on moral and religious grounds.”159 
Permanent reassignment is a drastic remedy that should rarely, if ever, 
be used by the judiciary.  Temporary reassignment, while uncommon, 
functions to ensure the due process right to a fair trial in front of an impartial 
judge.160  Reassignment plays an important role in maintaining judicial 
integrity at the state and federal level.161  Since the judiciary is reliant “on the 
public’s willingness to respect and follow its decisions,”162 reassignment can 
be used to insulate the judiciary from questions of improper bias. 
On the other hand, permanent reassignment opens up a plethora of 
options to the judiciary.  Hyper-partisan judges from a state’s highest court 
may attempt to weaponize permanent reassignment for quick political gain.  
In a judicial system that is rooted in the concept of an independent and 
impartial judiciary, allowing permanent reassignment to stand is a dangerous 
game. 
When the opportunity arises, courts should decide to seal off the 
possibility of permanent reassignment.  Indeed, in a First Amendment 
retaliation case, it is plausible that permanent reassignment could amount to a 
constructive discharge.  Perhaps armed with a better First Amendment case, a 
future judge may be able to successfully argue that permanent reassignment 
is an infringement on the judiciary’s First Amendment rights. 
 
 158.  In re Pulaski County Circuit Court, No. 17-155, 2017 Ark. LEXIS 154 
(2017) at *3 (Kemp, C.J., dissenting). 
 159.  Griffen, supra note 4. 
 160.   Toby J.  Heytens, Reassignment, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2014). 
 161.   Id.  As of 2014, 668 cases had been reassigned to different judges at the 
federal level.  Id. 
 162.  Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 446 (2015) (quoting Caperton v. 
A.T.  Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 889 (2009)). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Judge Griffen’s case provides an interesting look into the difficulties of 
preserving the constitutional protections of those who comprise our judiciary.  
With the advent of judicial participation in social media163 and a political 
climate that encourages judges to enter the political arena,164 courts will likely 
see an increase in litigation relating to judicial speech.  Courts would be wise 
to announce a clear standard for analyzing these claims, as continued litigation 
over extrajudicial speech would prove harmful to the judiciary’s image.  
Adopting Pickering’s balancing test would protect the due process rights 
of litigants and ensure the efficient running of our judicial system, while still 
allowing judges to exercise First Amendment rights as private citizens.  While 
Judge Griffen should follow the call to come into the courthouse with an open 
mind, Wendell Griffen, the private citizen, should continue to blog, tweet, and 
protest.  Of course, a judge who is active in the arena of public debate will be 
subject to challenges regarding the judge’s prior statements in a pending case, 
but this is the cost of allowing every citizen, regardless of position in our 
judicial system, to exercise First Amendment rights.   
 
 
 163.  Elizabeth Thornburg, Twitter and the #So-CalledJudge, 71 SMU L. REV.  
249 (2018). 
 164.  See Rambo, supra note 57, at 279–81 (discussing Justice Ginsburg’s 
comments on then-candidate Donald Trump in 2016). 
19
Charlton: A Judicial Balancing Act: Evaluating the First Amendment Claims o
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2020
